As ECB policy rates skirt the zero bound, expectations for the use of alternative tools, such as negative deposit rates are again on the rise. However, this is an ineffective and potentially harmful policy option.
Several problems may arise: transmission across other rates in the financial system is not guaranteed, bank profitability would almost certainly suffer, logistical problems could arise from a massive shift into physical cash and , most importantly, the ECB’s balance sheet would contract, just when the opposite is required.
More useful would be measures aimed at the de-fragmentation of EZ financial markets, such as a selective asset purchases or lending against a differentiated set of collateral rules.
Yet, it is questionable whether policies targeted at reigniting lending are sensible at all when the private sector is in a de-leveraging phase and impediments to growth are primarily structural.
The Fed surprised markets with a more hawkish posture than expected, suggesting the start of QE tapering in late 2013 and completion by mid-2014.
While Fed guidance may not ultimately come to pass, EM equity markets in particular remain subject to further downside. True, this year’s sell-off has been much more rapid than when QE ended previously. But its scale so far is similar-to-smaller.
The market sell-off may thus slow a bit or retrace temporarily, but EM equities are particularly vulnerable to a withdrawal of capital inflows.
The numbers involved are small. Yet, the Troika/Cyprus move to renege on deposit insurance and appropriate private funds is set to reverberate beyond the tiny island.
The decision bodes ill for future rescue efforts: 1) it derails popular support for any adjustment plan, 2) it reveals the ECB’s promise to do “whatever it takes “ and engage in unlimited OMTs as an empty bluff, 3) it puts the nail in the coffin of the putative European banking union and 4) it turns the plan to create a well-understood resolution regime and creditor hierarchy on its head.
All these serve to undermine the credibility and hence the efficacy of any future rescue attempt in the Eurozone.
Bill Gross argues that credit is losing its power and suffers from entropy, destined to a fatal supernova end. But pay heed to the power of compound interest and the fact that correlation does not establish causation and it is clear that PIMCO’s analysis is nothing but a fallacy of galactic dimensions. Continue reading →
Recent market perceptions notwithstanding, the Fed is unlikely to end its accommodative stance (incl. QE) anytime soon. However, this does not mean that asset markets will continue to derive undiminished support from such actions forever.
Calls for a Yen sell-off have been an ongoing feature of the economic Kommentariat for the past three years. They have gained renewed vigor as the BoJ engages in yet another round of quantitative easing against a backdrop of a relapse into recession, persistent deflation and a deterioration in Japan’s trade performance.
Yet, a sharp depreciation is unlikely, in particular against the USD. The BoJ lags other central banks significantly in the aggressiveness of its monetary operations, the Fed is likely to be further emboldened by the unavoidability of some degree of ‘fiscal cliff’, Japan’s worsening trade performance is dwarfed by the size of incoming capital flows and risk aversion is set to keep JPY bid.
This is not to say that there are not good reasons for the Yen to weaken in the medium term: demographic change and a declining savings rate represent powerful headwinds in the medium term. So does the potential of more radical steps by the BoJ. But neither are imminent and a sharp move beyond 80 thus remains unlikely for now.