China’s FX Rate: Strategy & Opportunism

Posted on August 17, 2015 by macrohart
  • China’s latest FX adjustment is neither a “competitive devaluation” nor the opening shot in a “currency war”. Given the negative contribution of net exports to growth as of late, it is also unrelated to efforts to boost growth.
  • Instead, the weakening of the exchange rate represents the unavoidable resolution of a policy conflict which saw the PBoC simultaneously tighten (to maintain the FX regime) and ease monetary policy (to combat deflation). Conveniently, it also aligns the PBoC’s tools better with market principles.
  • All China has to do now is to prevent the slide from becoming disorderly. For the moment, it has ample tools to do so.

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Three Simple Reasons Why the New Greek Government Will Blink

Posted on February 19, 2015 by macrohart

As the positions between the Greek government and the Troika harden, it appears that an agreement to extend the current bail-out program or secure some other form of official financing becomes ever more elusive. Yet, it is highly unlikely that the Syriza government will disengage from official financing, default or exit the Eurozone. Why? To put it succintly: Beggars can’t be choosers. For more, read on. Continue reading →

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Russia’s Ruble Let Loose Prematurely

Posted on November 7, 2014 by macrohart
  • Russia’s central bank yesterday abandoned its policy of unlimited FX intervention in support of the ruble. This precipitates the shift to a freely floating exchange rate regime which was due to commence only in 2015.  The move came in response to continued capital outflows, which had led to a 35% decline against the USD since June, a $71 bn loss in reserves (-15%) from October 2013 and a rise in interest rates by 400bps to 9.50% since the start of the year.

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A Glide Path for the Fed: Earlier, But More Predictable and Flexible Tapering

Posted on December 19, 2013 by macrohart
  • The Fed began the process of ending QE and thereby kicked off the end of a 30-year long cycle of progressively easier monetary conditions.
  • In starting the tapering process earlier than expected, the Fed has traded off incremental adjustments in the pace of its asset purchases against greater predictability and flexibility in its policy.
  • While beginning the “Long March Back” from experimental policy, the Fed provided detailed and explicit Forward Guidance, enhancing its conventional interest rate toolkit.
  • Successfully convincing markets of a self-sustaining recovery while maintaining a supportive monetary stance could create a “sweetspot” for risk-based assets and EM in 2014.

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A Bad Idea Returns: Negative Deposit Rates

Posted on December 2, 2013 by macrohart
  • As ECB policy rates skirt the zero bound, expectations for the use of alternative tools, such as negative deposit rates are again on the rise. However, this is  an ineffective and potentially harmful policy option.
  • Several problems may arise: transmission across other rates in the financial system is not guaranteed, bank profitability would almost certainly suffer, logistical problems could arise from a massive shift into physical cash and , most importantly, the ECB’s balance sheet would contract, just when the opposite is required.
  • More useful would be measures aimed at the de-fragmentation of EZ financial markets, such as a selective asset purchases or lending against a differentiated set of collateral rules.
  • Yet, it is questionable whether policies targeted at reigniting lending are sensible at all when the private sector is in a de-leveraging phase and impediments to growth are primarily structural.

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Market Prospects Ahead of the QE3 Wind-Down

Posted on June 25, 2013 by macrohart
  • The Fed surprised markets with a more hawkish posture than expected, suggesting the start of QE tapering in late 2013 and completion by mid-2014.
  • While Fed guidance may not ultimately come to pass, EM equity markets in particular remain subject to further downside. True, this year’s sell-off has been much more rapid than when QE ended previously. But its scale so far is similar-to-smaller.
  • The market sell-off may thus slow a bit or retrace temporarily, but EM equities are  particularly vulnerable to a withdrawal of capital inflows.

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Beyond Cyprus: Implications of the Latest “Unique Solution”

Posted on March 19, 2013 by macrohart
  • The numbers involved are small. Yet, the Troika/Cyprus move to renege on deposit insurance and appropriate private funds is set to reverberate beyond the tiny island.
  • The decision bodes ill for future rescue efforts: 1) it derails popular support for any adjustment plan, 2) it reveals the ECB’s promise to do “whatever it takes “ and engage in unlimited OMTs as an empty bluff, 3) it puts the nail in the coffin of the putative European banking union and 4) it turns the plan to create a well-understood resolution regime and creditor hierarchy on its head.
  • All these serve to undermine the credibility and hence the efficacy of any future rescue attempt in the Eurozone.

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PIMCO’s Galactic Fallacy about the Role of Credit

Posted on March 8, 2013 by macrohart
  • Bill Gross argues that credit is losing its power and suffers from entropy, destined to a fatal supernova end. But pay heed to the power of compound interest and the fact that correlation does not establish causation and it is clear that PIMCO’s analysis is nothing but a fallacy of galactic dimensions. Continue reading →
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(Fed) Talk is cheap. So don’t listen

Posted on February 25, 2013 by macrohart
  • Recent market perceptions notwithstanding, the Fed is unlikely to end its accommodative stance (incl. QE) anytime soon. However, this does not mean that asset markets will continue to derive undiminished support from such actions forever.

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Seven Reasons Not to Bet On A Falling Yen

Posted on November 9, 2012 by macrohart
  • Calls for a Yen sell-off have been an ongoing feature of the economic Kommentariat for the past three years. They have gained renewed vigor as the BoJ engages in yet another round of quantitative easing against a backdrop of a relapse into recession, persistent deflation and a deterioration in Japan’s trade performance.
  • Yet, a sharp depreciation is unlikely, in particular against the USD. The BoJ lags other central banks significantly in the aggressiveness of its monetary operations, the Fed is likely to be further emboldened by the unavoidability of some degree of ‘fiscal cliff’, Japan’s worsening trade performance is dwarfed by the size of incoming capital flows and risk aversion is set to keep JPY bid.
  • This is not to say that there are not good reasons for the Yen to weaken in the medium term: demographic change and a declining savings rate represent powerful headwinds in the medium term. So does the potential of more radical steps by the BoJ. But neither are imminent and a sharp move beyond 80 thus remains unlikely for now.

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